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ABSTRACT—It is easier to hold a company liable for workplace 
harassment perpetrated by a supervisor than by a coworker. In Vance v. 
Ball State University, the Supreme Court attempted to clarify the crucial 
yet enigmatic definition of “supervisor.” In doing so, the Court created a 
definition that early commentators criticized as too narrow and too 
inflexible to capture the varied structures of the modern workplace. In 
contrast to those commentators, this Note argues that Vance’s definition is 
flexible enough to encompass all workplaces. Vance’s definition does this 
by incorporating the tort concept of proximate causation into employment 
law. As this Note argues, Vance should be read to hold that a supervisor is 
someone who can proximately cause an employer to take a tangible 
employment action against another employee. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Kimberly Ellerth was a salesperson for Burlington Industries in 
Chicago.1 Ted Slowik was a vice president for one of Burlington’s 
divisions based out of New York.2 Slowik was not Ellerth’s direct 
supervisor and could not make hiring and firing decisions without approval 
from his supervisor.3 Over the course of about a year, Slowik made 
repeated unwelcome sexual advances toward Ellerth, including unwanted 
touching and suggesting that wearing revealing clothing would make her 
job “a whole heck of a lot easier.”4  
Ellerth sued Burlington Industries and played a key role in the 
development of how companies are held liable for harassment. Ellerth’s 
case established that, under federal employment law, employers are liable 
for harassment by supervisors unless they prove an affirmative defense 
developed by the Court.5 Employers are not similarly liable for harassment 
by coworkers—they are only liable for harassment by coworkers if the 
plaintiff proves that the employer was negligent in allowing the harassment 
to happen.6 The Court held that Slowik was a supervisor and that 
 
1 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 747 (1998). Following the procedural posture of 
the case, the facts related here assume that Ellerth’s allegations are true. See id.  
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. at 748. 
5 Id. at 765. Ellerth was decided on the same day as a twin case in which the Supreme Court 
reiterated the same framework for employer liability for harassment that it announced in Ellerth. See 
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998). 
6 Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2439 (2013). 
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Burlington Industries was liable unless it could establish the affirmative 
defense.7 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects employees from 
discrimination because of their race, gender, religion, and national origin.8 
As a result of Ellerth, it is easier to hold an employer liable if the plaintiff’s 
supervisor perpetrated the harassment than if a coworker was the harasser 
in a Title VII hostile work environment claim.9 However, the term 
“supervisor” does not appear in Title VII,10 and the definition of supervisor 
remained contested until 2013. 
The Supreme Court clarified the definition of supervisor in its 2013 
Vance v. Ball State University decision, holding that a person is a 
supervisor for purposes of Title VII liability “if he or she is empowered by 
the employer to take tangible employment actions against the victim.”11 
Vance purported to establish a “clear distinction” between supervisor and 
coworker,12 which could be “readily applied” by lower courts and 
litigants.13 Early commentators largely embraced the Vance Court’s 
characterization of its rule as clear, unambiguous, and easily 
administrable.14 
Despite the Court’s desire for a clear definition of supervisor, 
workplace hierarchy has become more complex and difficult to classify 
over the past thirty years.15 Corporations have become flatter and broader, 
requiring ultimate decisionmakers to delegate more authority.16 Like in 
Ellerth, decisions made by one supervisor may require approval from a 
 
7 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 766. 
8 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012).  
9 See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. 
10 Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2446. 
11 Id. at 2439. 
12 Id. at 2443. 
13 Id. at 2449. 
14 See, e.g., Stephen M. Flanagan, Supreme Court: Court Defines Who is “Supervisor” Under Title 
VII, FLETCHER CORP. L. ADVISER, Aug. 2013, at 2; Allan H. Weitzman & Laura M. Fant, 
The Vance Victory on the Definition of “Supervisor”—The “Back Story,” HR ADVISOR: LEGAL & 
PRAC. GUIDANCE, Sept.–Oct. 2013, at 8. But see Jeffrey M. Hirsch, The Supreme Court’s 2012–2013 
Labor and Employment Law Decisions: The Song Remains the Same, 17 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 
157, 173 (2013) (“[T]he Court made another questionable assertion in claiming that its rule is clear and 
easy to apply.”). 
15 Tristin K. Green, Work Culture and Discrimination, 93 CAL. L. REV. 623, 640–41 (2005); Susan 
Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 
458, 460–61 (2001).  
16 Raghuram G. Rajan & Julie Wulf, The Flattening Firm: Evidence from Panel Data on the 
Changing Nature of Corporate Hierarchies, 88 REV. ECON. & STAT. 759, 760–61 (2006) [hereinafter 
Flattening Firm] (studying 300 publicly traded U.S. companies from 1986 to 1998); see also Julie 
Wulf, The Flattened Firm—Not as Advertised, CAL. MGMT. REV., Fall 2012, at 6–9 [hereinafter Not as 
Advertised] (finding similar results with a data set spanning 1986 to 2006).  
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higher-level manager.17 Innovations like self-directed work teams18 and 
multisource job evaluations19 have muddied the lines of authority and 
influence in the workplace. Bright-line rules are ill suited to informal and 
nonhierarchical workplace dynamics.20 Despite purporting to establish a 
bright-line rule, Vance explicitly acknowledged these changing workplace 
dynamics.21 
In contrast to the initial conventional wisdom regarding Vance,22 this 
Note argues that Vance adopted a flexible rule for determining who counts 
as a supervisor rather than a bright-line rule. The Vance Court noted that, in 
cases where a formal decisionmaker relies on the opinion of another 
employee, “the employer may be held to have effectively delegated the 
power to take tangible employment actions to the employees on whose 
recommendations it relies.”23 This insight illuminates what Vance meant by 
“empowered by the employer to take tangible employment actions.”24 
Vance’s “effectively delegated” language makes its definition of supervisor 
susceptible to different interpretations in different workplace dynamics of 
influence. The Vance rule’s flexibility is its major advantage in addressing 
harassment in an increasingly complex and changing workplace. 
This Note demonstrates that Vance’s “effectively delegated”25 
language ties its definition of supervisor to another Title VII doctrine 
regarding employer liability: cat’s paw liability.26 Thus, the key to 
 
17 See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 747 (1998). 
18 Seung-Bum Yang & Mary E. Guy, Self-Managed Work Teams: Who Uses Them? What Makes 
Them Successful?, 27 PUB. PERFORMANCE & MGMT. REV. 60, 61 (2004). 
19 Fred Luthans & Suzanne J. Peterson, 360-Degree Feedback with Systematic Coaching: 
Empirical Analysis Suggests a Winning Combination, 42 HUM. RESOURCES MGMT. 243, 243–44 (2003). 
20 See Sturm, supra note 15, at 461. 
21 Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2452 (2013) (noting that in “modern organizations 
that have abandoned a highly hierarchical management structure,” day-to-day management functions 
may be shared among team members). 
22 See supra notes 12–14 and accompanying text. 
23 133 S. Ct. at 2452. 
24 Id. at 2454. 
25 Id. at 2452 (“If an employer does attempt to confine decisionmaking power to a small number of 
individuals, those individuals will have a limited ability to exercise independent discretion when 
making decisions and will likely rely on other workers who actually interact with the affected 
employee. Under those circumstances, the employer may be held to have effectively delegated the 
power to take tangible employment actions to the employees on whose recommendations it relies.” 
(citation omitted)). 
26 The term “cat’s paw” refers to the classic fable in which a monkey convinces a cat to pull some 
chestnuts out of a fire for them both to eat, and the monkey subsequently eats all of the chestnuts 
leaving none for the badly burned cat. Tim Davis, Beyond the Cat’s Paw: An Argument for Adopting a 
“Substantially Influences” Standard for Title VII and ADEA Liability, 6 PIERCE L. REV. 247, 248 
(2007) (explaining that in the Title VII context the nonbiased decisionmaker is the “cat’s paw” doing 
the dirty work for the biased influencer). 
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understanding what Vance means by “empowered by the employer to take 
tangible employment actions” lies in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
recognizing cat’s paw liability. In a cat’s paw situation, an employee acting 
based on impermissible bias proximately causes a nonbiased decisionmaker 
to take a tangible employment action. The employer may be liable even 
though the actual decisionmaker is not acting because of bias—that an 
employee acting because of bias proximately caused the decision may be 
sufficient for liability.27 Furthermore, the biased employee must have been 
acting within the scope of his employment or in a way that would make the 
employer liable under traditional agency principles when he proximately 
caused the tangible employment action to be taken.28 
This Note argues that, in accord with cat’s paw liability, Vance should 
be read to indicate that employees are supervisors if, while acting within 
the scope of their employment or in a way that would make the employer 
liable under traditional agency principles, they have the power to 
proximately cause a tangible employment action to be taken against 
another employee. Crucially, the scope-of-employment-or-similarly-liable 
limit prevents persons who truly are coworkers from being supervisors 
under this definition. 
Part I of this Note explores the agency principles that underlie both 
cat’s paw liability and employer vicarious liability for supervisory 
harassment. These agency principles are important guides to understanding 
the category of supervisor and how it fits into employer vicarious liability 
under Title VII. They are also important for understanding how cat’s paw 
liability maps onto Vance’s definition of supervisor. 
Part II of this Note demonstrates that Vance’s definition of supervisor 
incorporates the cat’s paw liability concept. Part II then establishes the 
contours of the supervisor as someone who can proximately cause a 
tangible employment action. Part II also explores why defining supervisor 
through ability to proximately cause a tangible employment action is 
normatively desirable. This flexible definition of supervisor is better than a 
bright-line rule at protecting employees from hostile work environments in 
the modern, flexible workplace. 
Finally, this Note explores how lower courts can administer the 
ability-to-proximately-cause standard. Courts are familiar with inquiring 
into hypothetical workplace power dynamics in other contexts, most 
notably the control test for determining if a worker is an employee or an 
 
27 See Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 422–23 (2011). 
28 See id. at 422 n.4. 
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independent contractor.29 In this context, courts have developed factor tests 
to enhance predictability and aid in administration. This Note proposes a 
factor test that courts could apply to implement the ability-to-proximately-
cause standard. 
I. BACKGROUND 
This Part lays out the doctrinal background for the rest of the Note. 
First, it explains the hostile work environment cause of action. It then 
explores the contours of employer liability for a hostile work environment 
and the agency principles that inform it. Then it presents Vance’s definition 
of supervisor and explores its nuances. Finally, this Part lays out the 
contours of cat’s paw liability as defined by the Supreme Court in Staub v. 
Proctor Hospital.30 
A. The Hostile Work Environment Cause of Action 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from 
discriminating against any worker “with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” based on race, gender, 
religion, or national origin.31 Most Title VII claims require that an 
employee demonstrate that the employer has changed the worker’s 
“compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment”32 by taking 
a tangible employment action against the worker.33 A tangible employment 
action is “a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, 
failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different 
responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.”34 
Tangible employment actions usually involve economic harm to the 
employee.35 A job reassignment absent a change in title, salary, or benefits 
does not count as a tangible employment action.36 
 
29 See infra notes 190–93 and accompanying text.  
30 562 U.S. 411. 
31 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012). 
32 Id. 
33 See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (establishing the classic 
Title VII burden-shifting proof framework for an individual disparate treatment claim); Griggs v. Duke 
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (recognizing an individual disparate impact cause of action under 
Title VII under which employers can be held liable for facially neutral employment policies that 
nevertheless discriminate impermissibly in their impact). 
34 Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 144 (2004) (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 
524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998)).  
35 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762 (“A tangible employment action in most cases inflicts direct economic 
harm.”). 
36 Id. at 761 (citing Harlston v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 37 F.3d 379, 382 (8th Cir. 1994) 
(holding that there was no tangible employment action because the plaintiff was reassigned “but 
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In a hostile work environment claim, however, courts do not require a 
tangible employment action.37 Congress intended Title VII “to strike at the 
entire spectrum of disparate treatment” in the workplace,38 and thus Title 
VII protects much more than just workers’ economic interest in continued 
employment, advancement, and fair pay.39 The central insight behind a 
hostile work environment cause of action is that a hostile environment that 
is sufficiently severe or pervasive alters an employee’s “compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.”40 Even without any 
tangible employment action, “the very fact that the discriminatory conduct 
[is] so severe or pervasive that it create[s] a work environment abusive to 
employees because of their race, gender, religion, or national origin offends 
Title VII’s broad rule of workplace equality.”41 
Absent a tangible employment action, however, an employer’s 
culpability for actions in the workplace becomes less certain. A tangible 
employment action, like hiring or firing, is an official act of the employer, 
and thus an employer is strictly liable for such actions when motivated by 
impermissible discrimination.42 An employer’s vicarious liability for 
discrimination that does not involve an official act of the enterprise is less 
obvious. 
B. Employer Vicarious Liability 
The Supreme Court addressed the puzzle of employer vicarious 
liability in twin cases, Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth43 and Faragher 
v. City of Boca Raton.44 Faragher and Ellerth established that if a 
supervisor creates a hostile work environment and there has been no 
tangible employment action, the employer is liable unless it proves an 
 
suffered no diminution in her title, salary, or benefits”)). By extension, giving day-to-day on-the-job 
direction would not count as a tangible employment action. 
37 Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986). 
38 Id. 
39 Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971) (“[T]he phrase ‘terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment’ in [Title VII] is an expansive concept which sweeps within its protective 
ambit the practice of creating a working environment heavily charged with . . . discrimination.”).  
40 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012); Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67. 
41 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993). 
42 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 762 (1998). 
43 Id. 
44 524 U.S. 775 (1998). In Faragher, Beth Ann Faragher, a lifeguard for the City of Boca Raton, 
was subjected to lewd remarks, offensive touching, and comments that were threats of tangible 
employment action from Bill Terry, the City’s Chief of Marine Safety, and David Silverman, his 
lieutenant. Id. at 780–81. Although Terry had the power to take tangible employment actions against 
Faragher subject to approval by higher management, Silverman’s responsibilities only included day-to-
day assignment of work and supervision of Faragher’s work and fitness training. Id. at 781. 
LEIGH (DO NOT DELETE) 11/10/2015 4:46 PM 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1060 
affirmative defense.45 The affirmative defense has two prongs. The 
employer may escape liability by showing (1) that it “exercised reasonable 
care to prevent and correct” the hostile work environment and (2) that the 
employee unreasonably failed to avoid harm by taking advantage of the 
employer’s offered preventative or corrective measures.46 Although the 
Court did not specifically decide the question of liability for coworker 
harassment in Ellerth and Faragher, it did note in Faragher that lower 
courts had “uniformly” required proof of negligence to hold employers 
liable for harassment by coworkers,47 and the Court has since confirmed 
this standard.48 In arriving at this holding, the Court elucidated the agency 
principles and policy considerations that underlie employer liability for 
harassment under Title VII.49 
1. Agency Principles.—Ellerth and Faragher looked to agency 
principles to establish employer liability for supervisor harassment. The 
Court has consistently held that Congress intended agency principles to 
guide an employer’s vicarious liability under Title VII and sought guidance 
from the Restatement (Second) of Agency.50 Agency principles dictate that 
an employer is liable for intentional or negligent torts committed by an 
employee acting within the scope of her employment.51 However, the Court 
rejected this agency principle as a basis for employer liability for 
harassment because an employee acting within the scope of her 
employment must be acting, at least in part, with a purpose to serve the 
employer.52 Thus, harassment is not within any employee’s scope of 
employment because harassment is not motivated by intent to serve the 
employer.53 
 
45 Id. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. 
46 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. 
47 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 799. 
48 Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2439 (2013). 
49 Id. at 2442 (referring to the Faragher and Ellerth framework as a “compromise” between agency 
principles and Title VII’s goal of encouraging employers to prevent harassment). The Court also looked 
to policy goals to shape Faragher and Ellerth’s affirmative defense, specifically mentioning Title VII’s 
goal of preventing discrimination, the goal of encouraging employers to adopt effective antiharassment 
policies, and the tort concept of a victim having the duty to mitigate and avoid damages. Faragher, 
524 U.S. at 806; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764. 
50 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 791–92; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754–55 (“In express terms, Congress has 
directed federal courts to interpret Title VII based on agency principles.”); Meritor Sav. Bank v. 
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986). 
51 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 755–56; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 793. 
52 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 756; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 793. 
53 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 757. Faragher acknowledges that the scope of employment analysis requires 
a policy judgment regarding whether the loss caused by the employee’s action should be borne by the 
employer as a normal risk inherent to being in business. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 797. However, the Court 
concluded that Title VII harassment is not within the scope of a supervisor’s employment. Id. at 798–99. 
109-4 LEIGH MASTER COPY II (DO NOT DELETE) 11/10/2015 4:46 PM 
109:1053 (2015) The Cat’s Paw Supervisor 
1061 
The Court instead looked elsewhere in the Restatement to justify 
employer liability for harassment, focusing on a provision stating that 
employers are liable for acts outside of an employee’s scope of 
employment if the employee was “aided in accomplishing the tort by the 
existence of the agency relation.”54 However, a strictly literal reading of the 
aided-by-agency-relation standard has the potential to provide too much 
employer liability: any act of workplace harassment is aided by proximity 
in the workplace. Thus, a literal reading of this standard would result in 
strict liability for employers for both supervisor and coworker harassment.55 
Strict liability would contradict Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson’s holding 
that employers should not be strictly liable for harassment56 and the lower 
court consensus57 that employers are only liable for coworker harassment if 
the employer was negligent.58 Thus, the Court in Ellerth and Faragher and 
subsequent lower courts have looked for principled justifications for 
treating supervisor and coworker harassment differently under an aided-by-
 
First, the Court held that Congress intended to incorporate into Title VII the traditional agency 
distinction between performing one’s job duties and actions outside of that, known as a “frolic.” Id. 
Harassing someone seems like a frolic compared to, for example, firing someone. Id. Second, the Court 
concluded that harassment is outside of the scope of any employee’s employment, noting that lower 
courts uniformly hold employers liable for coworker harassment only if the employer is negligent, even 
if the harassment was foreseeable in the course of business. Id. In contrast to harassment, one can 
envision a circumstance where a severely misguided and bigoted supervisor acts within the scope of his 
employment by discriminatorily firing someone in the ignorant belief that not having a woman or racial 
minority in that particular job would help the employer. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 757. 
54 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 758 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958)); Faragher, 
524 U.S. at 801 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958)). Notably, the Restatement 
(Third) of Agency removed the aided-by-agency-relation standard in favor of expanding the theory of 
employer liability involving an employee who, although acting outside of the scope of her employment, 
cloaks herself in the “apparent authority” of the employer in committing the tort. RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.08 (2006); see Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2441 n.2 (2013). 
Commentators have suggested that this clarification of agency principles destabilizes the Faragher and 
Ellerth framework because, absent at least a threat of a tangible employment action, the harassing 
supervisor is not operating under the employer’s “apparent authority.” See, e.g., Paul T. Sorensen, A 
Fresh Look at Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment, 27 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 509, 527 (2010). 
The Supreme Court has acknowledged this change in the Restatement but has not had occasion to 
change the Faragher and Ellerth framework due to it. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2441 n.2.  
55 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760 (“In a sense, most workplace tortfeasors are aided in accomplishing their 
tortious objective by the existence of the agency relation: Proximity and regular contact may afford a 
captive pool of potential victims.”); Faragher, 524 U.S. at 802 (“[T]here is a sense in which a harassing 
supervisor is always assisted in his misconduct by the supervisory relationship.”). 
56 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986) (“While [agency] principles may not be transferable in all their 
particulars to Title VII, Congress’ decision to define ‘employer’ to include any ‘agent’ of an employer, 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), surely evinces an intent to place some limits on the acts of employees for which 
employers under Title VII are to be held responsible.”). 
57 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 799. 
58 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 763–64 (noting that one dilemma involved in using the aided-by-agency-
relation standard is that “there are acts of harassment a supervisor might commit which might be the 
same acts a coemployee would commit, and there may be some circumstances where the supervisor’s 
status makes little difference.”); Faragher, 524 U.S. at 804. 
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agency-relation theory of employer liability for harassment.59 
2. Power to Take Tangible Employment Actions.—The distinction 
between supervisor and coworker harassment under the aided-by-agency-
relation standard may be that supervisors have the power to take tangible 
employment actions against their victim. The Supreme Court recognized in 
Ellerth that “[t]angible employment actions fall within the special province 
of the supervisor.”60 Lower courts have adopted this insight and held that 
the ability to take adverse employment actions is the “essence” of 
supervisory authority.61 Heeding Ellerth’s warning that “[t]he aided in the 
agency relation standard . . . requires the existence of something more than 
the employment relation itself,”62 courts have used this unique feature of 
supervisory authority to flesh out the application of the aided-by-agency-
relation standard to employer vicarious liability under Title VII.63 
Ultimately, Vance supports the view that, under the aided-by-agency-
relation standard, supervisors are those formally empowered to take 
tangible employment actions.64 
3. Authority and Employee Vulnerability.—In both Faragher and 
Ellerth, the Supreme Court noted that a supervisor’s inherent power in the 
workplace distinguishes him or her from a coworker for the purposes of the 
aided-by-agency-relation standard. The Court observed that “[w]hen a 
fellow employee harasses, the victim can walk away or tell the offender 
where to go, but it may be difficult to offer such responses to a 
supervisor.”65 While a coworker is aided by proximity in the workplace, the 
harassing supervisor is aided further by the hierarchical nature of the 
relationship. The touchstone of this conception of employer liability is the 
 
59 See, e.g., Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760 (recognizing that because “[t]he aided in the agency relation 
standard . . . requires the existence of something more than the employment relation itself,” the Court 
must give it more definition); Faragher, 524 U.S. at 802 (referring to the aided-by-agency-relation 
standard as the “appropriate starting point” for unraveling employer vicarious liability for harassment). 
60 524 U.S. at 762. 
61 See, e.g., Parkins v. Civil Constructors of Ill., Inc., 163 F.3d 1027, 1033–34 (7th Cir. 1998) 
(finding that “it is manifest that the essence of supervisory status is the authority to affect the terms and 
conditions of the victim’s employment,” and that “because liability is predicated on misuse of 
supervisory authority, the touchstone for determining supervisory status is the extent of authority 
possessed by the purported supervisor”); Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76, 95–96 (1st Cir. 
2005). 
62 524 U.S. at 760. 
63 See, e.g., Parkins, 163 F.3d at 1033–34 (holding that to qualify as a supervisor and thus incur 
employer liability without a demonstration of employer negligence, a harasser must have had the power 
to take tangible employment actions against his victim). 
64 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2439 (2013). 
65 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 803 (elaborating that “the victim may well be reluctant to accept the risks 
of blowing the whistle on a superior”); see also Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 763 (noting that “a supervisor’s 
power and authority invests his or her harassing conduct with a particular threatening character”). 
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employee’s vulnerability to supervisor conduct as judged by whether the 
employee feels free to remove herself from the situation or feels compelled 
to stay and “suffer the insufferable.”66 
Before Vance, many courts held that the power to take tangible 
employment actions was not necessary for supervisory authority.67 A 
supervisor who, for example, directs work but may not hire or fire still has 
“special dominance” over other employees, and this dominance 
significantly enhances his ability to impose a hostile work environment on 
another employee.68 After all, in recognizing a hostile work environment 
cause of action, the Supreme Court concluded that absent any tangible 
employment action, a supervisor could have such an effect on an employee 
that the supervisor’s actions violate Title VII.69 Despite Vance’s emphasis 
on ability to take tangible employment actions, the idea that employees are 
especially vulnerable to supervisors who are “clothed with the employer’s 
authority”70 remains relevant in explaining Title VII vicarious liability 
principles.71 
C. Vance Clarifies and Muddies the Waters 
Faragher and Ellerth’s affirmative defense makes the distinction 
between supervisor and coworker important for determining the burden of 
proof regarding employer vicarious liability. The Supreme Court attempted 
to define the term supervisor in Vance v. Ball State University.72 Writing 
 
66 Mikels v. City of Durham, 183 F.3d 323, 333–34 (4th Cir. 1999). 
67 Ellerth, for example, notes that there are circumstances in which “the supervisor’s status makes 
little difference” to the course of the harassment. 524 U.S. at 763. 
68 Mack v. Otis Elevator Co., 326 F.3d 116, 125–26 (2d Cir. 2003); see also Whitten v. Fred’s, 
Inc., 601 F.3d 231, 245 (4th Cir. 2010) (recognizing that “employees with only ‘some measure of 
supervisory authority’ could be aided by the agency relation, such that the imposition of vicarious 
liability would be appropriate”); Grozdanich v. Leisure Hills Health Ctr., Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 953, 973 
(D. Minn. 1998) (noting that supervisors in both Ellerth and Faragher for whose actions the Supreme 
Court held the employer vicariously liable did not have plenary power to take tangible employment 
actions and required sign-off from higher-ups to hire and fire). 
69 Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986). 
70 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 763 (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 77 (Marshall, J., concurring)). 
71 Indeed, by replacing the aided-in-agency-relation standard with an emphasis on the supervisor 
acting with the employer’s “apparent authority,” the Restatement (Third) of Agency seems to confirm 
this. According to the Restatement (Third) of Agency “[a]n agent acts with apparent authority with 
regard to a third party when the third party reasonably believes that the agent or other actor has 
authority to act on behalf of the principal and that belief is traceable to manifestations made by the 
principal.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.08 cmt. b (2006). Although this does not fit 
perfectly with the harassment context, it is analogous to the idea that, in a hostile work environment, an 
employee is particularly vulnerable to harassment by a supervisor because the supervisor has the 
authority to act under the “apparent authority” of the employer, whether or not he or she is exercising 
that authority in accordance with the employer’s wishes. Thus, the employee will feel less free to walk 
away or shut down the supervisory harassment. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 803.  
72 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2439 (2013). 
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for the majority, Justice Alito held that a supervisor is someone who is 
“empowered by the employer to take tangible employment actions against 
the [harassment] victim.”73 
The Vance majority and many initial commentators accepted Vance’s 
rule as clear and easily administrable. Justice Alito’s opinion purported to 
establish a “clear distinction” between supervisor and coworker,74 which 
could be “readily applied” by lower courts and litigants alike.75 Justice 
Thomas wrote a concurrence stating that while he continued to disagree 
with the Faragher and Ellerth framework, he joined the opinion “because it 
provides the narrowest and most workable rule for when an employer may 
be held vicariously liable for an employee’s harassment.”76 Early 
commentators also embraced the supposedly clear nature of Vance’s rule, 
with one noting that the Court’s “clearly defined concept of who is a 
supervisor can be readily applied by the courts,” and whether someone is a 
supervisor often “will be known even before litigation.”77 Other 
commentators noted that “[t]he Court’s decision adopted a bright-line 
practical standard easily applied by employers and employees, as well as 
courts.”78 
However, the Vance dissent79 and some early commentators80 cast 
doubt on how clear and administrable the Vance holding was, pointing 
specifically to Justice Alito’s statement that companies may in some cases 
“effectively delegate[]”81 supervisory authority to someone without the 
power to take tangible employment actions. In fact, Vance’s holding is 
much more ambiguous than it appears on its face.82 The Court left open the 
question of what level of power makes someone “empowered by the 
 
73 Id. Justice Alito based this holding on the need for a clear, unitary definition of supervisor and 
the belief that the essence of supervisory authority is the power to take tangible employment actions. Id. 
at 2448–49. 
74 Id. at 2443. 
75 Id. at 2449. 
76 Id. at 2454 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
77 Flanagan, supra note 14, at 2. 
78 Weitzman & Fant, supra note 14 at 8. 
79 Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2462 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“There is reason to doubt just how ‘clear’ 
and ‘workable’ the Court’s definition is. . . . And when an employer ‘concentrates all decisionmaking 
authority in a few individuals’ who rely on information from ‘other workers who actually interact with 
the affected employee,’ the other workers may rank as supervisors (or maybe not; the Court does not 
commit one way or the other).”). 
80 See, e.g., Hirsch, supra note 14, at 173.  
81 For details on Justice Alito’s statement, see supra note 23 and accompanying text.  
82 As Justice Ginsburg noted in her dissent, “[s]upervisors, like the workplaces they manage, come 
in all shapes and sizes.” Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2463 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Thus, it is difficult to tell 
who within a workplace is vested with authority to take tangible employment actions without an in-
depth inquiry into the particular workplace. Id. at 2462–63. 
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employer”83 to take a tangible employment action.84 
Perhaps acknowledging this concern, Justice Alito noted that in 
certain circumstances someone may be a supervisor without formally 
having the authority to take tangible employment actions. According to 
Justice Alito, if an employer confines formal decisionmaking authority to a 
small number of people, that small group of decisionmakers will “likely 
rely on other workers who actually interact with the affected employee” for 
information and advice regarding the employment action.85 In that 
circumstance, “the employer may be held to have effectively delegated the 
power to take tangible employment actions to the employees on whose 
recommendations it relies.”86 This “effectively delegated”87 insight is key to 
fleshing out the concept of being “empowered by the employer to take 
tangible employment actions.”88 
Justice Alito’s “effectively delegated” language directs the reader to 
the concept of cat’s paw liability. Justice Alito invokes a classic cat’s paw 
situation when he notes that an employer may have delegated supervisory 
authority to an employee when it relies on that employee’s 
recommendation to make decisions regarding tangible employment 
actions.89 Furthermore, in making his “effectively delegated” 
pronouncement, Justice Alito made two citations, which are useful in 
clarifying his meaning. First, Justice Alito cited Judge Rovner’s 
concurrence in Rhodes v. Illinois Department of Transportation.90 In 
Rhodes, Judge Rovner suggested rethinking Seventh Circuit precedent, 
which requires the ability to take tangible employment actions in order for 
a harasser to be considered a supervisor.91 Second, Justice Alito cited 
Ellerth for the proposition that an employer in certain circumstances may 
be held to have delegated supervisory authority.92 Ellerth, in turn, cited 
 
83 Id. at 2439 (majority opinion). 
84 As the dissent notes, “[w]hether a pitching coach supervises his pitchers (can he demote them?), 
or an artistic director supervises her opera star (can she impose significantly different responsibilities?), 
or a law firm associate supervises the firm’s paralegals (can she fire them?) are matters not susceptible 
to mechanical rules and on-off switches.” Id. at 2463 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
85 Id. at 2452 (majority opinion). 
86 Id.  
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 2439. 
89 Id. at 2452; see also Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 526 U.S. 411, 415–16 (2011) (describing a cat’s 
paw situation in which two biased employees used their influence to cause the ultimate nonbiased 
decisionmaker to fire the plaintiff). 
90 Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2452 (citing Rhodes v. Ill. Dep’t of Transp., 359 F.3d 498, 509 (7th Cir. 
2004) (Rovner, J., concurring)). 
91 359 F.3d at 509–10. 
92 Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2452 (citing Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 762 (1998)). 
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Shager v. Upjohn for this proposition.93 Shager coined the term “cat’s paw” 
liability to refer to the now-common theory in which an employer can be 
liable if one biased employee, acting with discriminatory intent, causes 
another nonbiased employee to take a tangible employment action against 
the plaintiff.94 Thus, Vance’s substance and doctrinal ancestry both indicate 
that cat’s paw liability is incorporated into Vance’s definition of supervisor. 
D. Cat’s Paw Liability 
1. Basic Cat’s Paw Doctrine.—In cat’s paw cases, an employer may 
be liable when one supervisor, harboring discriminatory intent, causes 
another supervisor who harbors no discriminatory intent to take a tangible 
employment action against an employee.95 In Staub v. Proctor Hospital,96 
the Supreme Court clarified the requirements for cat’s paw liability. 
Interpreting the statutory requirement that discrimination must be a 
“motivating factor” in the adverse action through the lens of “general tort 
law,”97 the Court held that “if a supervisor performs an act motivated by . . . 
animus that is intended by the supervisor to cause an adverse employment 
action, and if that act is a proximate cause of the ultimate employment 
action, then the employer is liable . . . .”98 The Court reasoned that all 
necessary elements for a Title VII violation reside with the biased 
supervisor: the supervisor has a discriminatory intent and acts on that intent 
to cause a tangible employment action.99 
The Court thus incorporated the traditional tort concept of proximate 
 
93 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762. 
94 Shager v. Upjohn, 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that the employer could be liable 
for discriminatorily firing an employee because the committee that actually fired the employee acted on 
the intentionally discriminatory recommendation of a supervisor, thus acting as the supervisor’s “cat’s 
paw”). 
95 See Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 422–23 (2011). 
96 Id. at 424–25. In Staub, the Court held that Proctor Hospital could be liable for firing Vincent 
Staub, a military reservist, due to antimilitary animus even though the supervisor who actually fired 
Staub, Linda Buck, was not motivated by any antimilitary animus. Id. at 422–23. The court held that 
liability could exist because Ms. Buck’s decision to fire Mr. Staub was causally based on the opinions 
of other biased supervisors. Id. Those other biased supervisors’ antimilitary animus caused Mr. Staub’s 
termination even if they did not actually fire him. Id. Although Staub arose out of the Uniformed 
Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), which makes employment actions 
motivated by antimilitary bias unlawful, the Court recognized that the USERRA and Title VII’s 
operative language makes the two statutes “very similar,” and cited Title VII cases in its analysis of 
USERRA. Id. at 417. 
97 Id. at 417.  
98 Id. at 422 (footnote omitted). 
99 Id. at 419 (“Animus and responsibility for the adverse action can both be attributed to the earlier 
agent (here, Staub’s supervisors) if the adverse action is the intended consequence of that agent’s 
discriminatory conduct.”). 
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causation into the Title VII context.100 It defined proximate cause as “some 
direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct 
alleged . . . exclud[ing] only those link[s] that are too remote, purely 
contingent, or indirect.”101 The use of proximate causation has not gone 
without criticism—one commentator noted that “[t]he notoriously flexible 
and inconsistent theoretical underpinnings of proximate cause make it 
likely that courts purporting to import proximate cause will actually be 
making relatively unguided policy decisions.”102 
Crucially, Staub limits the scope of cat’s paw liability in a way that 
makes it less likely for the employer to be found liable for a coworker’s 
biased actions than for a supervisor’s. Staub did not explicitly address 
whether, on the principles it adopted, a coworker could create cat’s paw 
liability for an employer.103 However, according to Staub, biased 
nondecisionmakers must be acting within the scope of their employment or 
in such a way that “liability would be imputed to the employer under 
traditional agency principles.”104 This limitation makes a coworker cat’s 
paw situation rare. It is much more likely that a supervisor would be acting 
within the scope of her employment in influencing the ultimate 
decisionmaker than it would be for a coworker to do the same.105 
The Court rejected the defendant’s contention that an intervening 
independent investigation into the grounds for the tangible employment 
action would necessarily shield an employer from liability by severing the 
causal connection between the impermissible bias and the tangible 
employment action.106 The Court noted that, under tort law, the exercise of 
judgment by a later decisionmaker does not prevent an earlier 
decisionmaker’s action from being the proximate cause of the resulting 
harm unless the ultimate decisionmaker’s action was a “cause [of the 
employment action] of independent origin that was not foreseeable.”107 
Thus, a decisionmaker’s independent investigation into the grounds for 
firing an employee will not necessarily exempt an employer from liability 
if the earlier action by the biased supervisor remains a factor in the adverse 
 
100 Id. at 420. 
101 Id. at 419 (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
102 Sandra F. Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, the Common Law, and Proximate Cause, 2013 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1, 3 (2013) (“Proximate cause has no independent descriptive power and is highly 
dependent on the underlying tort to which it is attached.”). 
103 562 U.S. at 422 n.4.  
104 Id.  
105 See Abdelhadi v. City of New York, No. 08-CV-380, 2011 WL 3422832, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 
4, 2011) aff’d sub nom. Abdelhadi v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Corr., 472 F. App’x 44 (2d Cir. 2012). 
106 Staub, 562 U.S. at 421. 
107 Id. at 420 (quoting Exxon Co. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830, 837 (1996)). 
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employment action.108 
Justice Alito, the author of the majority opinion in Vance, concurred in 
Staub, arguing for narrower cat’s paw liability than the majority. Justice 
Alito stated that there is liability only where the supervisor with formal 
decisionmaking authority has sufficiently delegated authority to the 
supervisor with discriminatory intent such that the formal decisionmaker 
merely “rubberstamps” the decision.109 According to Justice Alito, in order 
to satisfy the statutory requirement that discrimination be a “motivating 
factor” for the action, the discriminatory intent must be “in the mind” of the 
decisionmaker and cannot come indirectly from another source.110 In his 
concurrence in Staub, Justice Alito used language very similar to his 
discussion in the Vance plurality regarding employer liability despite the 
employer cabining supervisory authority to just a few decisionmakers. In 
both, Justice Alito stressed that an employer has “delegated” the authority 
for the tangible employment action to an employee who is not formally 
empowered to take tangible employment action.111 
2. Cat’s Paw Policy Considerations.—Commentators have noted 
that in establishing this proximate causation standard and sanctioning cat’s 
paw liability, the Court adapted Title VII to trends in how companies 
structure their personnel decisions. Direct employer liability (as distinct 
from cat’s paw liability) encourages employers to adopt diffuse structures 
in making personnel decisions as a check on decisionmaker bias.112 In line 
with this, the use of human resources departments as the formal 
decisionmaker in personnel decisions has boomed.113 Cat’s paw liability 
responds to this trend by ensuring that employers cannot escape liability if 
impermissible motives still play a role in such a diffuse decisionmaking 
process. Cat’s paw liability thus encourages employers to conduct 
independent investigations before the formal decisionmaker takes action to 
 
108 Id. at 421. 
109 Id. at 424–25 (Alito, J., concurring).  
110 Id.  
111 Compare id. at 425 (“Where the officer with formal decisionmaking authority merely 
rubberstamps the recommendation of others, the employer, I would hold, has actually delegated the 
decisionmaking responsibility to those whose recommendation is rubberstamped.”), with Vance v. Ball 
State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2452 (2013) (“[T]he employer may be held to have effectively delegated 
the power to take tangible employment actions to the employees on whose recommendations it relies.”). 
112 See Timothy P. Powderly, Note, Limiting the Ways to Skin a Cat—An End to the Twenty Year 
Perplexity of the Cat’s Paw Theory in Staub v. Proctor?, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 617, 635 (2012).  
113 Benjamin Pepper, Note, Staub v. Proctor Hospital: A Tenuous Step in the Right Direction, 
16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 363, 373 (2012). 
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interrupt the causal relationship between a possibly biased input and the 
formal decision.114 
II. DEFINING “SUPERVISOR” THROUGH CAT’S PAW LIABILITY 
This Note argues that a proper reading of Vance is that a harasser is a 
supervisor if, acting within the scope of her employment or in a way that 
would make the employer liable under other agency principles, the harasser 
can proximately cause the employer to take a tangible employment action 
against the harassed employee. In Vance, Justice Alito wrote that where an 
employer confines formal decisionmaking power to only a few individuals, 
the employers will have “effectively delegated” supervisory authority to the 
employees who will inevitably influence the formal decisionmaker’s 
actions.115 This statement complicates the seemingly clear definition of 
supervisor that Justice Alito established in Vance.116 Justice Alito’s 
“effectively delegated” language doctrinally and substantively incorporates 
cat’s paw liability into Vance’s definition of supervisor. This language 
should inform how lower courts understand what it means to be 
“empowered by the employer to take tangible employment actions.”117 
This Part will first establish the doctrinal connection between Vance’s 
definition of supervisor and cat’s paw liability. Then, this Part will explore 
how cat’s paw liability, as described in Staub, fits into the definition of 
supervisor in the hostile work environment context. Finally, this Part will 
explore how reading cat’s paw liability into the definition of supervisor set 
out in Vance is normatively desirable, and how courts can apply the cat’s 
paw supervisor standard. 
A. The Doctrinal Connection Between Vance and Cat’s Paw Liability 
Three points of connection demonstrate that cat’s paw liability is 
incorporated into Vance’s definition of supervisor: two citations Justice 
Alito makes in Vance, substantive similarities between the two concepts, 
and the implications of agency principles. First, Justice Alito indicated that 
Vance’s definition of supervisor is more nuanced than a bright-line rule by 
 
114 See Keaton Wong, Note, Weighing Influence: Employment Discrimination and the Theory of 
Subordinate Bias Liability, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1729, 1750–51, 1754 (2008) (arguing that a weak cat’s 
paw causation requirement disincentivizes independent investigation because independent investigation 
would not stop liability, and too strong a causation standard disincentivizes investigation because there 
would not be liability even without an independent investigation). 
115 Vance, 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2452 (2013). 
116 Id. at 2439 (“We hold that an employee is a ‘supervisor’ for purposes of vicarious liability 
under Title VII if he or she is empowered by the employer to take tangible employment actions against 
the victim . . . .”).  
117 Id. 
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citing a concurrence in a Seventh Circuit case criticizing the exact bright-
line rule that Vance supposedly adopted. Citing to Rhodes v. Illinois 
Department of Transportation, Justice Alito wrote that “[i]f an employer 
does attempt to confine decisionmaking power to a small number of 
individuals, those individuals . . . will likely rely on other workers who 
actually interact with the affected employee.”118 In Rhodes, Judge Rovner 
encouraged the Seventh Circuit to rethink the very bright-line rule that, 
according to some, the Supreme Court adopted in Vance: that an employee 
is only a supervisor if given formal authority to take tangible employment 
actions.119 Judge Rovner noted that the Seventh Circuit’s bright-line rule 
does not “comport with the realities of the workplace.”120 In Rhodes, the 
plaintiff worked at a maintenance yard remote from the central control of 
the Illinois Department of Transportation.121 The plaintiff’s alleged 
harassers were the lead employees at the yard: they were responsible for 
the plaintiff’s day-to-day work assignments, but they did not have the 
authority to take a tangible employment action against the plaintiff.122 
Although acknowledging that under Seventh Circuit precedent the alleged 
harassers were not supervisors, Judge Rovner encouraged the Seventh 
Circuit to rethink its hardline stance, noting that it excludes employees who 
“enjoy substantial authority over the plaintiff’s day-to-day work life” from 
the category of supervisors.123 Justice Alito’s citation to Rhodes 
demonstrates that his definition of supervisor in Vance is much more 
nuanced than his clear-cut statement regarding power to take tangible 
employment actions would indicate. 
Another citation makes the direct link between Vance’s nuanced 
concept of supervisory authority and cat’s paw liability.124 In support of his 
statement that in certain instances an employer may have “effectively 
delegated” supervisory authority without formally bestowing it,125 Justice 
Alito cited Ellerth’s statement that a tangible employment action is an 
official act of the employer and “may be subject to review by higher level 
 
118 Id. at 2452 (citing Rhodes v. Ill. Dep’t of Transp., 359 F.3d 498, 509 (7th Cir. 2004) (Rovner, 
J., concurring)). 
119 Rhodes, 359 F.3d at 510. 
120 Id.  
121 Id. at 501 (majority opinion).  
122 Id. at 501–02. 
123 Id. at 510 (Rovner, J., concurring). 
124 Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2452 (2013). 
125 Id. (stating that in a case where an employer has cabined formal authority to take tangible 
employment actions to just a few people, “the employer may be held to have effectively delegated the 
power to take tangible employment actions to the employees on whose recommendations it relies”). 
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supervisors.”126 Ellerth, in turn, cited to Shager v. Upjohn.127 In Shager, 
“the [biased] supervisor did not fire plaintiff; rather, [a committee] did, but 
the employer was still liable because the committee functioned as the 
supervisor’s ‘cat’s-paw.’”128 Shager, furthermore, is the case that 
introduced the term cat’s paw liability to employment law.129 Vance’s 
doctrinal ancestry thus demonstrates that a cat’s paw theory is incorporated 
into Vance’s definition of supervisor. 
Second, Vance’s acknowledgement that supervisory authority may be 
found in a case in which an employer “rel[ies] on other workers who 
actually interact with the affected employee”130 is precisely a cat’s paw 
situation—the formal decisionmaker acts as the cat’s paw for the employee 
on whose input the decisionmaker relies.131 Using Staub’s terms, the 
employee giving the input has proximately caused the tangible employment 
action.132 Vance, thus, incorporates the concept of being able to proximately 
cause a tangible employment action into its definition of supervisor. 
The similarity in language between Justice Alito’s Vance opinion and 
Staub concurrence supports this substantive connection. In Vance, Justice 
Alito wrote about an employer having “effectively delegated” supervisory 
authority to an employee who is not formally empowered to take tangible 
employment actions when the formal decisionmaker relies on that 
employee’s recommendations.133 In Staub, Justice Alito wrote that an 
employer is “actually delegating” decisionmaking authority to an employee 
whose recommendation is rubberstamped by the formal decisionmaker.134 
Although the modifier attached to “delegating” is different, the substantive 
concept of delegation in each is very similar. Justice Alito’s language in 
Vance is similar enough to his Staub concurrence that it is reasonable to 
think that he is referring to the same concept in both: cat’s paw liability. 
Finally, incorporating cat’s paw liability into the definition of 
supervisor is also consistent with the agency principles that underlie the 
Faragher and Ellerth framework. Faragher and Ellerth posit that 
 
126 Id. at 2442 (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 762 (1998) (citing Shager 
v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990))). 
127 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762 (citing Shager, 913 F.2d at 405).  
128 Id. 
129 Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 526 U.S. 411, 415 n.1 (2011). 
130 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2452 (2013). 
131 Indeed, this fact pattern succinctly describes the facts of Staub itself. See 526 U.S. at 413–16 
(describing a situation in which two workers, acting based on impermissible bias, influenced the 
nonbiased formal decisionmaker to fire Staub). 
132 See id. at 422. 
133 133 S. Ct. at 2452. 
134 526 U.S. at 424–25 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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employers are liable for supervisory harassment when the harassment is 
“aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency 
relation[ship].”135 Supervisory authority “invests [a supervisor’s] harassing 
conduct with a particular threatening character.”136 Thus, the supervisor’s 
agency relation to the victim aids supervisory harassment, and the 
employer should be liable. A supervisor’s harassment is especially 
threatening because of the supervisor’s ability to take tangible employment 
actions against a victim.137 Given this reasoning, it does not make sense to 
differentiate between formal decisionmakers and persons who can 
proximately cause tangible employment actions. A person who has the 
power, for example, to recommend someone’s termination is aided in 
harassment by his agency relation to the harassment victim even if he could 
not sign the paperwork formally terminating the harassed employee. 
Additionally, the Restatement (Third) of Agency has eliminated the 
aided-by-agency-relation standard in favor of expanding the apparent 
authority theory of agency liability.138 This change also supports reading 
cat’s paw liability into the definition of supervisor. Under the Restatement, 
apparent authority exists when “a third party reasonably believes the actor 
has authority to act on behalf of the principal and that belief is traceable to 
the principal’s manifestations.”139 In this situation, the harassment victim 
would be the “third party,” and the harasser would be the “actor.” An 
employee who can proximately cause a tangible employment action against 
the victim by, for example, making a recommendation or giving a poor 
performance review, is certainly “clothed with the employer’s authority,” 
even if they do not have formal decisionmaking powers.140 Furthermore, in 
many cases, this apparent authority will be caused by the employer’s 
 
135 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 758 (1998) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF AGENCY § 219 (1958)); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 801 (1998) (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958)). Although Ellerth and Faragher significantly 
depart from the aided-by-agency-relation standard, they use this standard as a “starting point” for their 
theory. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 802. 
136 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 763 (also noting, however, that “there may be some circumstances where 
the supervisor’s status makes little difference”); see also Faragher, 524 U.S. at 803 (“When a fellow 
employee harasses, the victim can walk away or tell the offender where to go, but it may be difficult to 
offer such responses to a supervisor . . . .”). 
137 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 803. 
138 Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2441 n.2; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.08 cmt. b (2006) (“This 
Restatement does not include ‘aided in accomplishing’ as a distinct basis for an employer’s (or 
principal’s) vicarious liability. The purposes likely intended to be met by the ‘aided in accomplishing’ 
basis are satisfied by a more fully elaborated treatment of apparent authority and by the duty of 
reasonable care that a principal owes to third parties with whom it interacts through employees and 
other agents.”). 
139 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 (2006). 
140 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 763 (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 77 (1986)). 
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actions—referred to as the “principal’s manifestations” in the 
Restatement—such as putting the harasser in a more senior position than 
the harassed employee.141 Thus, under an apparent authority theory, there is 
no reason to differentiate between employees with formal authority to take 
tangible employment actions and those who can proximately cause tangible 
employment actions. Agency principles, on which employer vicarious 
liability under Title VII is based,142 support reading cat’s paw liability into 
the definition of supervisor in Vance. 
B. The Contours of the Cat’s Paw Supervisor 
In Staub, the Supreme Court defined the theory of cat’s paw liability, 
which Justice Alito incorporated into his definition of supervisor in Vance. 
Staub defines cat’s paw liability as a situation in which an employee 
proximately causes an adverse employment action to be taken against a 
plaintiff, where the employee who proximately causes the employment 
action (1) is motivated by impermissible bias, (2) intends to bring about the 
adverse employment action, and (3) is acting within the scope of her 
employment or in a way in which liability would be imputed to the 
employer under traditional agency principles.143 By making cat’s paw 
theory implicit in its definition of supervisor, Vance provides that someone 
is “empowered by the employer to take tangible employment actions 
against the victim”144 and thus a supervisor when that person, acting within 
the scope of her employment or in another way that could make the 
employer liable, has the power to proximately cause a tangible employment 
action to be taken against the victim. While this definition includes formal 
decisionmakers as supervisors, the formal authority to take tangible 
employment actions against the victim is not dispositive to supervisory 
status. 
Although in his concurrence Justice Alito understood cat’s paw 
liability to be much narrower than the Staub majority did, lower courts 
should use the Staub majority’s version of cat’s paw liability in defining 
supervisor. Justice Alito laid the textual and doctrinal groundwork for 
incorporating cat’s paw liability into the definition of supervisor, but the 
Staub majority provides mandatory precedent defining the concept of cat’s 
paw liability. On statutory grounds, the majority rejected Justice Alito’s 
 
141 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 (2006); see, e.g., Mack v. Otis Elevator Co., 326 
F.3d 116, 120 (2d Cir. 2003) (in which an elevator mechanic was harassed by the “mechanic in charge,” 
a position given to a senior mechanic whenever there were five or more mechanics on a single job). 
142 Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2441 (citing Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760–63; Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72). 
143 Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 526 U.S. 411, 422 & n.4 (2011). 
144 133 S. Ct. at 2439. 
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view that “the employer should be held liable only when it ‘should be 
regarded as having delegated part of the decisionmaking power’ to the 
biased supervisor.”145 Justice Alito’s restriction is unnecessary because 
“[a]nimus and responsibility for the adverse action can both be attributed to 
the earlier [biased] agent” under the proximate causation standard even 
without the employer having effectively delegated decisionmaking 
authority to the biased agent.146 A more restrictive view would create a 
situation where any independent investigation by the formal decisionmaker 
would prevent employer liability despite animus being the proximate cause 
of a tangible employment action. This would be an “implausible meaning 
of the text” of Title VII.147 In the context of the definition of supervisor, a 
narrower reading of cat’s paw liability—one that excludes a proximate 
cause standard—would frustrate the purpose of Vance’s “effectively 
delegated” language: flexibility in the face of shifting or poorly defined 
workplace hierarchies. 
For this reason, the Staub majority held that a biased agent who 
proximately causes the tangible employment action “possessed supervisory 
authority delegated by their employer and exercised it in the interest of 
their employer.”148 It makes sense that, for example, a senior employee who 
the employer relies on for recommendations concerning tangible 
employment actions should be considered to have supervisory authority 
due to her role in making employment decisions.149 It would thus 
contravene established Supreme Court precedent to restrict supervisory 
authority through a cat’s paw theory to a narrow set of situations in which 
an employer has effectively delegated supervisory authority to a nonformal 
decisionmaker. A person who can proximately cause an adverse 
employment action has supervisory authority. 
1. Adapting Cat’s Paw to the Harassment Context.—The cat’s paw 
definition of supervisor does not require that the supervisor have an 
impermissibly motivated intent to cause a tangible employment action to be 
taken against the victim of the harassment. In the hostile work environment 
context, intent to cause a tangible employment action is unnecessary. In 
contrast to other Title VII claims, a hostile work environment claim does 
not require any tangible employment action—the statutorily prohibited 
 
145 Staub, 526 U.S. at 421 (quoting Alito, J., dissenting). 
146 Id. at 419. 
147 Id. at 420. 
148 Id. 
149 See, e.g., Rhodes v. Ill. Dep’t of Transp., 359 F.3d 498, 510 (7th Cir. 2004) (Rovner, J., 
concurring). 
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change in “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” motivated by 
impermissible bias150 is created by “severe or pervasive” harassment rather 
than a tangible employment action.151 Thus, it would not make sense to 
require specific intent to cause a tangible employment action for someone 
to qualify as a supervisor for purposes of a hostile work environment claim. 
A person is a supervisor if she fulfills the rest of the Staub requirements: 
that the harasser, acting within the scope of her employment or in a way 
that would make her liable under other agency principles, can proximately 
cause the employer to take a tangible employment action against the 
harassed employee.152 
2. Within Scope of Employment or Imputable to the Employer 
Through Other Agency Principles.—Importing cat’s paw 
liability’s agency-based limitations into Vance’s definition of supervisor 
limits the category of supervisor to persons who have at least some 
authority over the harassed victim. In accordance with Staub, a supervisor 
must be able to proximately cause a tangible employment action when 
acting “within the scope of his employment, or when . . . liability would be 
imputed to the employer under traditional agency principles.”153 Faragher 
and Ellerth establish that the main agency principle applicable to employer 
liability in the harassment context is the aided-by-agency-relation 
standard.154 Two agency principles in the disjunctive thus form the outer 
bounds of the cat’s paw supervisor155: “acting in the scope of . . . 
employment”156 or being “aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence 
of the agency relation.”157 The Restatement (Third) of Agency eliminates 
the aided-by-agency-relation standard in favor of an expanded apparent 
authority standard, which is thus another possibility for employer liability 
under this theory.158 
All three of these theories are based in some way on a supervisor’s 
 
150 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012). 
151 Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986). 
152 526 U.S. at 422 & n.4. 
153 Id. at 422 n.4. 
154 See supra Part I.B.1. 
155 Staub cites to Ellerth for the proposition that cat’s paw liability is limited by agency principles 
of liability. Staub, 526 U.S. at 422 n.4. Ellerth, in turn, looks to the Restatement (Second) of Agency to 
explain the two possibilities noted above for employers being liable for harassment. Burlington Indus., 
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 755–56 (1998) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 
(1958)). 
156 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 756. 
157 Id. at 758 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958)). 
158 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.08 cmt. b (2006). 
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formal or informal “special dominance” over an employee.159 Most 
obviously, a supervisor acting within the scope of his employment is 
exercising his formal authority as supervisor.160 Formal authority includes 
the authority to hire, fire, or take another tangible employment action 
against the employee.161 
Someone may also be a supervisor because she is aided by her agency 
relation in her ability to proximately cause the employer to take a tangible 
employment action against the harassed victim.162 This could arise in a 
situation similar to Rhodes, in which, for example, the harasser is the 
victim’s day-to-day supervisor.163 In this type of situation, the harasser’s 
ability to proximately cause a tangible employment action against the 
victim exists because of the structure of the agency relationship. 
Finally, courts should recognize that a person is a supervisor if she can 
cause a tangible employment action while acting with the apparent 
authority of the employer.164 Apparent authority requires a reasonable belief 
on the part of the harassment victim that the harasser has the authority to 
take tangible employment actions against them, and that belief must be 
traceable to a manifestation on the part of the employer.165 An example of 
this situation would be where an employee who has been designated by the 
employer as a lead employee harasses a junior employee, and the junior 
employee reasonably believes that the lead employee can proximately 
cause his termination despite the lead employee lacking that formal 
authority.166 
All of these scenarios fit with the insight that an employee is 
particularly vulnerable to harassment by a supervisor. In Faragher, the 
Supreme Court noted that “[w]hen a fellow employee harasses, the victim 
can walk away or tell the offender where to go, but it may be difficult to 
 
159 Mack v. Otis Elevator Co., 326 F.3d 116, 125–26 (2d Cir. 2003); see supra Part I.B.3 
(discussing employee vulnerability to supervisor authority). 
160 See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762. 
161 See supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text (discussing the definition of tangible 
employment action). 
162 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 758. 
163 Rhodes v. Ill. Dep’t of Transp., 359 F.3d 498, 501–02 (7th Cir. 2004) (in which the plaintiff 
worked in maintenance yard remote from the central control of the Illinois Department of 
Transportation and was harassed by the lead employees in the yard, who did not have formal authority 
to take tangible employment actions against the victim). 
164 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.08 (2006). 
165 Id. § 7.08 cmt. b. 
166 See, e.g., Mack v. Otis Elevator Co., 326 F.3d 116, 120 (2d Cir. 2003) (in which an elevator 
mechanic was harassed by the “mechanic in charge,” a position given to a senior mechanic whenever 
there were five or more mechanics on a single job). 
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offer such responses to a supervisor . . . .”167 This is also consistent with 
circuit court holdings that, prior to Vance, emphasized supervisors’ “special 
dominance” over employees rather than the formal power to hire and fire 
when determining employer liability in a hostile work environment 
context.168 
These agency limits on the cat’s paw supervisor also prevent 
employees who are truly coworkers from being considered supervisors. A 
true coworker cannot proximately cause the employer to take a tangible 
employment action while acting in the scope of his employment, while 
aided by his agency relation, or by using the employer’s apparent 
authority.169 If someone can proximately cause a tangible employment 
action to be taken against another employee while acting in these ways, it 
stretches the plain meaning of the term to call him just a coworker. 
C. Policy Implications 
Defining supervisor through the ability to proximately cause a tangible 
employment action is desirable for several reasons. First, this theory creates 
law that is flexible enough to address the myriad workplace structures that 
exist in the modern world. Second, this definition is well suited to a hostile 
work environment claim, which by definition does not require a tangible 
employment action and instead requires frequent and severe harassment. 
Third, this theory is administrable by the courts, which are used to 
inquiring into hypothetical workplace power dynamics in the common law 
tests for who is an employee. 
The increasingly nonhierarchical and team-based nature of the 
workplace requires hostile work environment rules that are adaptable to 
new corporate structures. In the past several decades, companies have been 
flattening their structures, increasing the use of teams, and implementing 
evaluation systems that involve not just bosses but also one’s coworkers 
and subordinates.170 Since the 1980s, large U.S. businesses have decreased 
the number of employees between the lowest level worker and CEO and 
 
167 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 803 (1998) (elaborating that “the victim may 
well be reluctant to accept the risks of blowing the whistle on a superior.”); see also Burlington Indus., 
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 763 (1998) (noting that “a supervisor’s power and authority invests his or 
her harassing conduct with a particular threatening character . . . .”). 
168 Mack, 326 F.3d at 125–26; see supra Part I.B.3 (discussing employee vulnerability to 
supervisor authority). 
169 See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the agency restrictions on cat’s paw liability).  
170 Green, supra note 15, at 640–41 (noting that these changes mean that social interactions and 
thus work culture take increasing importance in the workplace). Professor Green argues that existing 
hostile work environment doctrine fails to address the discriminatory effect of work culture because, 
among other reasons, it “tend[s] to focus on targeted, exclusionary conduct by particular, identifiable 
harassers.” Id. at 657.  
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increased the number of workers who directly report to the CEO.171 There 
has also been an increase in the use of specialized decisionmakers with 
firm-wide authority, such as human resources managers.172 This dynamic 
leads to more decisions being made in a formally centralized manner and 
also leads to more input into those decisions from various different parts of 
the organization.173  
At the same time, self-managing work teams are becoming more 
prevalent.174 Self-managing work teams, as their name suggests, are groups 
of workers who have the power to direct their own work through some 
internal process without outside management approval.175 Anywhere from 
69% to 82% of U.S. firms use self-managing work teams in some 
capacity.176 Self-managing work teams often operate by consensus, and 
decisions may include all aspects of personnel decisions as well as 
production decisions.177 Employee evaluation has followed this same trend, 
with employees increasingly being evaluated on their job performance by 
their peers and even subordinates.178 The increased focus on teamwork and 
corporate culture has involved more and more employees in each new 
hiring decision because the new hire must “fit” with the rest of the team.179 
Defining supervisor through power to proximately cause a tangible 
employment action helps adapt Title VII rules to a decentralized workplace 
decisionmaking model, an area in which traditional Title VII rules can 
break down.180 Decentralization of workplace authority requires flexible 
 
171 Flattening Firm, supra note 16, at 760; Not as Advertised, supra note 16, at 10. 
172 Not as Advertised, supra note 16, at 12.  
173 Not as Advertised, supra note 16, at 11 (“Since CEOs are time-constrained, they have less time 
to allocate to each subordinate when they have more direct reports. It follows that subordinates are 
making more decisions, and that CEOs are more hands-off as they push decisions down—a form of 
decentralization. On the other hand, a broader span means that the CEO has more direct connections 
deeper in the organization, and is potentially more involved in decision making across more 
organizational units. Thus division managers’ decision making is subject to more direct oversight by a 
hands-on CEO who exercises more control and pushes decisions up—a form of centralization.”).  
174 Yang & Guy, supra note 18, at 60.  
175 Id. at 61. 
176 Id. at 60. 
177 Andrew Polland, Note, The Emergence of Self-Directed Work Teams and Their Effect on Title 
VII Law, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 931, 934 (2000). Polland argues that traditional Title VII law, which 
emphasizes the presence of discriminatory intent in taking a tangible employment action, is ineffective 
in the context of group decisionmaking in which any decision will necessarily have several intents 
behind it. Id. at 959.  
178 See Luthans & Peterson, supra note 19, at 243–44 (noting that companies such as Intel, Boeing, 
Xerox, FedEx, and Dupont all use 360-degree evaluation systems in which managers get feedback from 
peers and subordinates).  
179 Green, supra note 15, at 638 (footnote omitted). 
180 Sandra F. Sperino, A Modern Theory of Direct Corporate Liability for Title VII, 61 ALA. L. 
REV. 773, 791 (2010) (noting how courts frequently oversimplify complex corporate decisionmaking in 
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rules. In a workplace in which teams, multisource evaluations, and 
flattened hierarchies shape personnel decisionmaking, bright-line rules are 
unlikely to be effective in capturing workplace power dynamics that make 
supervisory harassment especially problematic. These bright-line rules will 
inevitably be “underinclusive, overinclusive, or both.”181 For example, even 
if a human resources manager were the only person in a company with the 
formal authority to take tangible employment actions against employees, it 
would be underinclusive to label the human resources manager as the only 
supervisor in the company. A bright-line rule will inadequately account for 
the variety and fluidity of modern workplace structures.182 The supervisor 
through proximate causation standard solves these problems, because by its 
nature it is flexible and applicable to any workplace. Although proximate 
causation has been criticized as indeterminate and policy driven,183 this is 
an advantage in the context of the modern workplace. 
Furthermore, cutting day-to-day supervisors who do not have formal 
hiring and firing power out of the category of supervisor runs counter to 
two of the major features of the hostile work environment cause of action. 
The hostile work environment cause of action, as its distinguishing feature, 
does not require a tangible employment action against the employee.184 
Instead, the hostile work environment cause of action relies on “severe or 
pervasive” harassment.185 Commentators have noted that courts frequently 
require repeated, pervasive misconduct in order to establish a hostile work 
environment cause of action.186 As a practical matter, it is less likely that 
 
the Title VII context). 
181 Sturm, supra note 15, at 461. Professor Sturm argues that we have moved past first generation 
workplace discrimination, characterized by overt policies of exclusion and subordination and that 
modern workplace discrimination challenges are instead characterized by “subtle, interactive, and 
structural bias,” such as a case in which male coworkers without the power to hire or fire a woman 
colleague nevertheless freeze her out of the workplace’s social interactions, thereby marginalizing her. 
Id. at 468–74. Professor Strum argues that a rule-based approach will be ineffective at curbing second-
generation discrimination. Id. at 470–74. 
182 Id. at 475–76; Susan Sturm, Race, Gender, and the Law in the Twenty-First Century 
Workplace: Some Preliminary Observations, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 639, 645 (1998) (arguing that 
these new workplace dynamics “require[] embracing the challenge of developing new forms of legal 
regulation that treat organizational decision makers and incentive structures explicitly as part of the 
legal regulatory regime”). 
183 See Sperino, supra note 102, at 3 (“Proximate cause has no independent descriptive power and 
is highly dependent on the underlying tort to which it is attached.”). This is a virtue in the context of a 
fluid workplace hierarchy, though—it frees courts from focusing on arbitrary rules and allows them to 
focus on the power dynamic that makes supervisory harassment such a concern. 
184 Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).  
185 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22–23 (1993) (establishing the “frequency of the 
discriminatory conduct” as relevant to the hostile work environment cause of action). 
186 Elisabeth A. Keller & Judith B. Tracy, Hidden in Plain Sight: Achieving More Just Results in 
Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment Cases by Re-Examining Supreme Court Precedent, 
15 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 247, 258 (2008); Heather L. Kleinschmidt, Reconsidering Severe or 
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pervasive harassment will come from a distant supervisor who has the 
authority to hire or fire rather than from a day-to-day supervisor who has 
daily access to the victim. Indeed, the pervasiveness prong of the hostile 
work environment standard protects workers from exactly this kind of 
persistent, day-to-day harassment. Although the Supreme Court has made it 
clear that there must be some difference in employer liability between 
supervisory and coworker harassment,187 it does not make sense to draw 
this line at the formal power to take tangible employment actions given the 
content of the hostile work environment cause of action. The cat’s paw 
supervisor standard preserves the distinction between supervisor and 
coworker188 while also allowing for recovery for pervasive harassment by 
day-to-day supervisors who may not have the formal power to hire and fire 
but are nonetheless hard for victims to rebuff because of their power within 
the office hierarchy. The cat’s paw supervisor standard thus gets to the 
heart of the policy concern that supervisory harassment is especially 
insidious due to the unequal power dynamic between supervisor and 
employee.189 
D. Administrability 
The cat’s paw supervisor theory is administrable. Courts frequently 
are asked to inquire into hypothetical workplace power dynamics. For 
example, courts inquire into employer control of workers to determine if a 
worker is an independent contractor or an employee for the purposes of 
employee protection laws.190 A similar control test is used to determine 
whether a person is an employee or independent contractor for the purpose 
of establishing the ownership of copyrighted work.191 These tests focus on 
hypothetical power dynamics in the workplace—the degree of control the 
employer exercises over the putative employee.192 Courts have developed 
 
Pervasive: Aligning the Standard in Sexual Harassment and Racial Harassment Causes of Action, 
80 IND. L.J. 1119, 1129 (2005); Eric Schnapper, Some of Them Still Don’t Get It: Hostile Work 
Environment Litigation in the Lower Courts, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 277, 323–24. 
187 See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 760 (1998). 
188 See supra Part II.B.2. 
189 See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 803 (1998) (“When a fellow employee 
harasses, the victim can walk away or tell the offender where to go, but it may be difficult to offer such 
responses to a supervisor . . . .”).  
190 See, e.g., Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures Inc., 293 F.R.D. 516, 525–26 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), 
vacated, 791 F.3d 376 (2d Cir. 2015) (looking to two different factor tests to determine Fox 
Searchlight’s level of control over production interns to decide if the unpaid interns were employees 
protected by federal and state labor laws). 
191 See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751 (1989) (“In determining 
whether a hired party is an employee under the general common law of agency, we consider the hiring 
party’s right to control the manner and means by which the product is accomplished.”). 
192 Id. at 751–52. 
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factor tests to aid in determining the hypothetical workplace dynamic.193 
Courts inquiring into workplace power dynamics in the cat’s paw 
supervisor context should develop a factor test to aid administrability. 
A possible cat’s paw supervisor factor test could focus on many 
factors drawn from harassment and cat’s paw cases and policy 
considerations. Factors could include the harasser’s formal power to take 
tangible employment actions against the plaintiff,194 the harasser’s 
responsibility for evaluating the plaintiff’s work and how consequential 
those evaluations are,195 the harasser’s responsibility for day-to-day 
supervision of the plaintiff,196 the harasser’s position in the corporate 
structure relative to the plaintiff and the person formally charged with 
making tangible employment decisions,197 the employer’s practice of 
conducting independent inquiries into the plaintiff’s job performance,198 
and whether the formal decisionmaker is at the same job site as the 
plaintiff.199 A court applying Vance’s empowered-to-take-tangible-
employment-action standard should mine the case law to determine what 
factors courts have used to determine supervisory power and integrate 
those factors into its factor test. A factor test, while not as bright a line as 
Vance’s early commentators desired, provides a structure that employers 
and lower courts can use to predict whether an employee will be deemed to 
be a supervisor. 
CONCLUSION 
Vance established that, for Title VII hostile work environment 
purposes, a supervisor is an employee who is “empowered by the employer 
 
193 See id.; Glatt, 293 F.R.D. at 525–26. 
194 This is the simplest reading of Vance’s “empowered by the employer to take tangible 
employment actions” rule. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2439 (2013). Certainly, an 
employee who has the formal power to “bring[] the official power of the enterprise to bear on 
subordinates” is a supervisor. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 762 (1998). 
195 See Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 526 U.S. 411, 420 (2011) (“An employer’s authority to reward, 
punish, or dismiss is often allocated among multiple agents. The one who makes the ultimate decision 
does so on the basis of performance assessments by other supervisors.”). 
196 See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 781, 808 (1998) (referring to David 
Silverman, who was responsible for the plaintiff’s daily work assignments and supervision but who did 
not have the authority to hire and fire, as a “supervisor”). 
197 See id. at 781 (describing how the plaintiff, a lifeguard, reported directly to her harassers, a 
lifeguard lieutenant and the Chief of Marine Safety, who in turn reported to managers at the parks 
department, who were responsible for approving all hiring and firing decisions). 
198 See Staub, 526 U.S. at 421–22 (holding that the existence of an independent investigation is 
relevant to deciding if a biased employee’s actions were the proximate cause of a tangible employment 
action but declining to adopt a bright-line rule regarding independent investigations). 
199 See Rhodes v. Ill. Dep’t of Transp., 359 F.3d 498, 501–03 (7th Cir. 2004) (describing a situation 
in which the harassers were the lead employees at a job site remote from any formal decisionmakers).  
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to take tangible employment actions against the victim.”200 This definition 
seems clear but demands that courts define what constitutes being 
“empowered by the employer” to take such actions. Courts should read 
Vance as holding that a harasser is “empowered by the employer to take 
tangible employment actions”201 and is thus a supervisor if the harasser can 
proximately cause the employer to take a tangible employment action 
against his victim while acting within the scope of his employment, while 
aided by the agency relationship, or while acting with the employer’s 
apparent authority. This definition is well suited to the hostile work 
environment cause of action, which does not require any tangible 
employment action to be taken against the plaintiff and instead requires 
frequent and severe harassment of the plaintiff. Furthermore, this rule is 
flexible enough to be applied to myriad workplaces and yet still concrete 
enough for courts to apply during litigation. 
 
 
200 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2439 (2013). 
201 Id. 
